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The relationship between publicly reported weekly grid premiums and discounts 
for specific carcass characteristics and the percentage of those characteristics reflected in 
total weekly slaughter volume (i.e., proportional slaughter volume) is investigated.  
Granger Causality and multi-lag VAR models were used to investigate if grid premiums 
and discounts were efficiently transmitting market signals to producers with respect to 
carcass quality attributes.  The empirical evidence indicates that there is little evidence to 
suggest that grid prices are providing efficient price signals to buyers and sellers with 
respect to market valuation of desirable and undesirable beef carcass characteristics.   
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Recent studies on the effectiveness of grid pricing of slaughter cattle to transmit 
market signals on the market value of individual carcass quality characteristics from the 
packer to the fed cattle producer suggest that grid pricing has fallen short of industry 
expectations (e.g. Johnson and Ward 2005, 2006). Johnson and Ward report that carcass 
quality characteristics only explain 30 to 40 percent of individual carcass value. 
Furthermore, they report that grid yield and grade discounts associated with carcass 
characteristics explain the majority of that 30 to 40 percent variability in per-head 
revenue.  
Findings from the 2005 National Beef Quality Audit (NCBA 2006), indicate that 
the industry is still struggling with the same quality and marketing issues that plagued the 
industry in the 1980s (Value Based Marketing Task Force 1990). The 2005 NBQA 
highlighted the following recurring issues still confronting the industry: a) excess fat 
production, b) inconsistent meat quality, c) the need for clearer market signals, and d) 
inconsistent carcass quality. The 2005 NBQA findings also suggest that annual changes 
in average carcass quality have stagnated since the late 1990s.  In addition, a recent study 
released by Certified Angus Beef 
TM, Corah and McCully (2006) report that the 
percentage of heifers and steers grading prime or choice declined from 58% to 54% and 
48% to 44%, respectively. Their findings are based on data collected from 1999 to 2005 
on approximately 19.8 million carcasses.  
 The introduction of grid pricing in the mid-1990s, as a pricing mechanism 
consistent with the philosophy of a value based marketing system, has not alleviated these problems facing the beef industry.  It is apparent that additional research is needed 
on the ability of the grid pricing system to transmit consistent carcass quality price 
signals through the fed cattle marketing channel.  Our objective is to investigate the 
relationship between publically reported weekly grid premiums and discounts for specific 
carcass characteristics and the percentage of those characteristics reflected in total weekly 
slaughter volume (i.e., proportional slaughter volume).  
Literature Review 
 
The phrase “value based marketing” generally refers to a marketing system that 
establishes the true market value of a product, based on product characteristics. The Beef 
Industry’s perceived need for a value based marketing system for slaughter cattle was 
articulated in the final report (War on Fat) issued by the Value Based Marketing 
Taskforce (1990). The beef industry’s motivation for embracing the concept of value 
based marketing was driven by a desire to improve beef’s competitive position in the red 
meat industry and reverse the dramatic decline in beef demand from 1979 to 1998.
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The Value Based Marketing Task Force provided recommendations for 
transforming the beef production and marketing system based on value based marketing 
principles. These recommendations were conveyed through an outline containing eight 
consensus points for industry action along the entire beef supply chain. Consensus point 7 
focused on the fed cattle market and recommended that “Fed cattle should be valued on 
an individual carcass basis rather than an average price basis.” 
The Task Force indentified the traditional practice of selling pens of fed cattle at 
an average price as a weakness in the beef supply chain and an impediment to the 
development of a value based marketing system for beef. This conclusion has been supported in the economics literature (e.g. Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner 1993).  Average 
pricing of fed cattle refers to the traditional industry practice of selling cattle by the pen at 
an average price per hundred weight.   
Average pricing generates pricing inefficiency because above-average and below-
average cattle in a pen receive the same price per cwt.  Average pricing distorts the 
transmission of market information to producers about the true market value of carcass 
attributes.  This distortion contributes to production inefficiencies that result in 
inconsistent product quality, failure to provide consumers with beef products having a 
level of quality they demand, and excess fat production. Thus, average pricing distorts 
market signals and poses “… a barrier to the transmission of consumer preferences for a 
particular type of beef product to the fed cattle producer….” (Fausti, Feuz, and Wagner 
1998, p.74).   Therefore, a key industry objective for a value based pricing mechanism is 
the provision of efficient price signals to buyers and sellers with respect to market 
valuation of desirable and undesirable beef carcass characteristics. 
The Task Force’s recommendation to sale fed cattle on an individual carcass basis 
has encouraged the development of value based pricing mechanisms for fed cattle. These 
pricing mechanisms are classified as “grid pricing” systems.  The typical grid pricing 
mechanism determines the market value of an individual beef carcass based on yield 
grade, quality grade, and carcass weight. The U.S. beef packing industry began 
developing prototype grid pricing systems in the early 1990s. These prototype systems 
expanded carcass premiums and discounts beyond the traditional “Grade & Yield” 
individual carcass pricing system. One example of a prototype appearing in the literature 
is the Excel Corporation’s Muscle Scoring System (Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner 1993).  The introduction of grid pricing has provided the market with a pricing 
mechanism that is designed to overcome inefficiencies associated with selling cattle by 
the pen (live-weight or dressed-weight) at an average price per hundred cwt. However, 
Feuz (1999) discussed the practice of large packing firms adjusting their grid premium 
and discount schedules based on plant averages.  The implication is that grid premiums 
and discounts not only vary across firms but can also vary across plants within a firm.  
The variation across grid pricing mechanisms within the industry may be contributing to 
the reported finding in the 2005 NBQA that the fed cattle marketing system is still not 
providing “clear market signals.” 
In October 1996, the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) began 
publishing weekly grid premium and discount price reports: National Carcass Premiums 
and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers (USDA-AMS). The AMS designed the 
structure of the weekly report to mirror the premium and discount structure of an additive 
pricing grid consistent with industry standards (Fausti, Feuz, and Wagner, 1998). These 
reports provided the market with weekly industry averages based on information 
voluntarily provided by the packing industry. The AMS weekly survey collects 
information on: a) yield-grade and quality-grade premiums and discounts, b) heavy and 
light weight carcass discounts, and c) discounts for carcass defects, such as injection 
lesions, dark cutters, etc. (Fausti, Feuz, and Wagner, 1998). In April of 2001, the 
Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act went into effect. As a result of this new 
legislation, firms in the meat packing industry are required to report all grid premium and 
discount information to the AMS on a weekly basis. 
 Theory: 
A feedlot firm purchases feeder cattle based on perceived physical characteristics 
and genetic quality. Carcass quality varies as much within breed as across breeds.  The 
firm expends resources to select feeder cattle that will produce the highest average 
carcass quality possible given market conditions. However, the quality of feeder cattle 
also vary due to seasonal patterns, pasture conditions, and cow herd management 
practices irrespective of genetic background.  In addition, market conditions, primarily 
feed costs in conjunction with finished cattle prices also affect the firm’s decision 
concerning carcass endpoint quality. Firm’s weigh the marginal benefit of attaining a 
specific level of average carcass quality against the marginal cost associated with current 
market prices for fed cattle, feed input, and carcass quality attributes. Profit maximization 
requires the firm to select a carcass quality endpoint based on the profit maximizing 
principle of marginal revenue equals marginal cost.   
Assuming profit maximizing behavior of producers, four competing theories are 
proposed to explain the market relationship between grid premiums and discounts and the 
weekly proportional slaughter volume of carcass attributes associated with those prices.  
The four scenarios are; a) competitive market forces simultaneously determine price and 
quantity, b) competitive market forces transmit consistent price signals that provide 
carcass quality incentives and disincentives that affect producer production behavior, c) 
noncompetitive forces are affecting market price determination process, and d) grid 
premiums and discounts are at insufficient levels and have no affect on producer 
behavior.  Within a competitive market framework, buyers and sellers of fed cattle have no 
influence over market prices.  Ideally, fed cattle producers should target carcass quality 
attributes based on grid premiums and discounts being paid.  Assume the market 
mechanism provides consistent market signals to producers with respect to desirable and 
undesirable carcass attributes based on market supply and demand conditions for those 
attributes.  As a consequence, a long-run relationship between grid premiums and 
discounts and carcass quality attributes of cattle slaughtered should exist.   
Given this behavioral structure, weekly equilibrium price and quantity are simultaneously 
determined by exogenous variables affecting supply and demand conditions in the market 
as discussed above in scenario “a.”   
Grid pricing mechanisms are hypothesized to be the incentive mechanism within 
a wider value based marketing initiative that has been ongoing in the beef industry since 
the early 1990s (Fausti, Feuz, and Wagner, 1998). The literature on grid pricing suggests 
that the grid market share of cattle slaughter has increased since the late 1990s (Schroeder 
et al. 2002, Taylor et al. 2007). It is the general view that as more cattle are sold on a 
grid, a larger proportion of producers will adjust production practices to meet carcass 
quality standards according to the price signals transmitted by grid pricing mechanisms.  
This view is consistent with scenario “b.” 
Scenario “c” states that past proportional slaughter volume levels for a particular 
carcass quality attribute affect its respective current price.  Typically, economic theory 
equates the market condition of market quantity determining market price as being 
symptomatic of non competitive market forces affecting market outcomes.  Scenario “d” suggests that the level of a particular grid premium or discount is not 
sufficient to affect producer production behavior.  This implies the marginal benefit of 
improving a particular carcass quality attribute is less than the marginal cost of changing 
production practices.   
Formally, we hypothesize that the introduction of grid pricing for the purpose of 
changing production behavior over time can be empirically tested by estimating the 
Granger Causal relationship between weekly grid premiums and discounts (Pi) and 
proportional slaughter volume reflecting those carcass attributes (Qi).  We propose the 
following interpretation for the possible Granger Causality outcomes between Pi and Qi 
within a time series context for scenarios a thru d:  
a) if a particular grid price is responding to only general market clearing signals that 
reflect supply and demand conditions, then we would expect Bidirectional Granger 
Causality, i.e., a simultaneous feedback system between Pi to Qi,  
b) if a grid premium or discount is affecting the average quality of a particular carcass 
attribute then Unidirectional Granger Causality from Pi to Qi,  
c) if average quality of a particular carcass attribute is affecting its respective grid 
premium or discount then Unidirectional Granger Causality from Pi to Qi, 
d)   If no Granger Causal relationship is found between Pi and Qi, then the grid pricing 
mechanism is not providing any relevant market information associated with market 




Data was obtained from the Agricultural Marketing Services, an agency within the 
United States Department of Agriculture.  The data collected is for the post Mandatory 
Livestock Price Reporting period: July 23, 2001 to July 7, 2008.   
Grid premium and discount data was collected on national slaughter cattle grid 
premium and discount prices for two quality grade price categories (Prime and Choice/ 
Select Discount), and three yield grade categories (Yg1.0-2.0,  Yg4.0-5.0, and Yg5).  
These data were collected from a weekly AMS publication (USDA-AMS: the National 
Carcass Premiums and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers weekly report).  
The slaughter volume data was collected from the National Steer & Heifer 
Estimated Grading Percent Report (AMS NW_LS196) published weekly by the USDA-
AMS. The AMS NW_LS196 report provides information on the breakdown of quality 
and yield grade percentages for weekly national cattle slaughter for the respective carcass 
quality characteristics associated with grid premium and discount data.   
Empirical Methodology and Results:  
The concept of causality within a time series framework was introduced by 
Granger (1969). Granger’s empirical methodology is based on the idea that a “Granger 
Causal Relationship” exist if past values of xt can be used to better predict current values 
of yt. If this is true, then this relationship is expressed as xt “Granger Causes” yt.   
There are several caveats associated with degree of statistical robustness when 
using Granger’s empirical technique: a) for bilateral causality both random variables 
must be stationary, b) the selection of lag length for the sampling period, and c) relevant variables which influence both xt and yt may be the source of the causal relationship 
between xt and yt. 
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Our focus is on the relationship of a weekly price of a beef carcass trait and the 
proportion of that trait as a percentage of weekly slaughter volume.  However we are not 
sure about the direction of Granger Causality. Toward that end, we use the following 
VAR (n) model:  
1.   
2.   
The null hypothesis of  does not Granger cause  can be specified as 
3.  , 
and the null hypothesis of  does not Granger cause  can be specified as 
4.  . 
Furthermore, cattle prices and slaughter volume are subject to seasonal variation. 
Grid premiums and discounts and the associated proportional slaughter volume were 
deseasonalized by regressing these variables upon seasonal monthly dummy variables. 
This was done to remove seasonality as a potential source of false causality.  Unit root 
tests for stationary were conducted. The unit root tests indicated that the premium for 
prime, the discount for YG4-5, and the weekly volume value for YG4-5 were non 
stationary. The first-difference of these variables was found to be stationary and utilized 
for the Granger Causality tests. The results for the Granger Causality tests are 
summarized in the next three tables;  
a) Table 1 provides results for a VAR (4) model,  
b) Table 2 provides the results for a VAR (12) model, and  c) Table 3 provides the results for a VAR (24) model.  











PRIMEV  PRIME  no  no  independent 
CHOICEV  SELECT DISC  yes  no  Volume 
YG1V  YG1-2  no  no  independent 
YG4V  YG4-5  no  no  independent 















PRIMEV  PRIME  no  no  independent 
CHOICEV  SELECT DISC  no  no  independent 
YG1V  YG1-2  no  no  independent 
YG4V  YG4-5  no  no  independent 
YG5V  YG5  yes  yes  simultaneous 
 
 











PRIMEV  PRIME  yes  yes  simultaneous 
CHOICEV  SELECT DISC  no  no  independent 
YG1V  YG1-2  no  yes  Price 
YG4V  YG4-5  no  no  independent 




Five premium and discount categories were selected for the analysis. Four basic 
theoretical scenarios were provided according to the four potential empirical outcomes 
generated by the Granger Causality tests (S= simultaneous, P=price, V=volume, 
I=independent).  The Granger Causality tests were conducted using three different VAR 
modeling assumptions.  The Granger Causality results are mixed across the three VAR models. Table 4 
provides a summary of Granger Causality results across VAR models. The summary 
suggests that there is little evidence to support theoretical scenarios b&c.  The implication 
is that the grid pricing mechanism, on average, has not provided consistent carcass 
quality incentive and disincentive signals to producers during the time period of this 
study. Furthermore, grid price market signals reflecting general market supply and 
demand conditions for particular carcass attributes appears to be very weak across all 
categories except for the YG-5 discount.  In support of this conclusion, if the levels of 
significance for the Granger Causality tests are set at the 5% level, then only the YG2 
VAR (24) result and the YG5 results for all three VAR models remain significant.  
Table 4: Summary of Granger Causality Results 
Across VAR models 
  VAR(4)  VAR(12)  VAR(24) 
Prime  I  I  S 
Choice/Select Disc  V  I  I 
YG2  I  I  P 
YG45  I  I  I 
YG5  P  S  S 
 
Summary: 
The empirical results do suggest that grid premiums and discounts did little to 
influence producer behavior with respect to modifying production practices to alter 
carcass characteristics.  Once possible explanation for this finding is that producer 
behavior during this period was influenced by the incentive to produce heavier cattle due 
to low corn prices and relative high fed cattle prices. Johnson and Ward (2005), among 
others, have reported in the literature that hot carcass weight is a primary determinate of carcass revenue.  It should be noted that the lack of Granger Causality does not rule out a 
contemporaneous relationship between P1 and Qi. 
On a final note, this study is the first in the literature to empirically test if grid 
prices are providing efficient price signals to buyers and sellers with respect to market 
valuation of desirable and undesirable beef carcass characteristics.  Our study suggests 
that the NBQA (2006) call for clear market signals is justified.  
Footnotes: 
1.  See (Mintert 2007) for data on trends in beef demand during this period.  
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